I want to preface this article by saying I've worked with FBI agents in the past, and they are certainly not dumb people. It just seems that the department in its current form shouldn't be allowed near computer systems.
Case in point: the FBI suspects a company of defrauding telecoms Verizon and AT&T, so they obtain a warrant to confiscate and examine the equipment that comprises the company's Internet-facing infrastructure. They then proceed to rip out rack upon rack of equipment belonging to dozens of completely independent, unrelated companies who are unfortunate enough to have been leasing space in the same datacenter.
Why the shotgun approach to something which would have been easily settled with a few civilized phone calls? Mark White, a spokesman for the FBI's Dallas office, explains (as quoted in this Wired article):
"My understanding is that the way these things are hooked up is that they're interconnected to each other," he says. "Company A may be involved in some criminal activity and because of the interconnectivity of all these things, the information of what company A is doing may be sitting on company B or C or D's equipment."
Clearly not an authority to be taken lightly.
At this point I don't feel as though I can share any thought which hasn't already ocurred to any legitimate IT engineer reading this article. However, I would like to emphasize that now might be a good time to update your disaster recovery plans to consider the potential misadventures of three-letter organizations.
What concerns me most about this raid is the painfully evident lack of sufficient IT training in the Bureau. Hopefully their recent recruiting initiative will bring in some fresh talent (though it would help if they paid better).
As a footnote, my favorite part of the story is that the FBI is asking for the owners of the equipment taken to contact them and identify their hardware if they want it returned. Apparently the agents didn't even know whose gear they were taking.